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LAND USE PLANNING AND WOODLAND MANAGEMENT: A CASE 
STUDY OF LOCAL CONTROL AND REGULATORY CAPACITY ON 
HOUSEHOLD AND COMMUNAL WOODLAND RESOURCES IN 
ZIMBABWE'
C. Nhira
Center for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, P O Box MP167, Harare________■
The article is in two sections and addresses the issues surrounding how small-scale communal farmers protect and 
control the use o f tree resources on individual plots and communal woodland resources. The first section is descriptive 
and the second section is explanatory. Three sets offorms o f control can be identified: individual household controls on 
household controlled resources, cultural forms o f control tied to traditional sacred and secular institutions, and secular 
controls synonimous with different layers/categories o f state institutions. I  argue that cultural forms o f control are rather 
diffuse in their operation and effect. State-imposed controls and those issued through state-created community 
institutions, despite being mentioned across all sections o f the community, were not enforced to the extent that community 
members abided by them. Exclusion o f non-community members was the exception.
The second section attempts to unravel the forces behind the ineffectiveness o f community institutions. I  argue that 
contests over the control o f resources within the community (and, paradoxically, the need to build community goodwill) 
and power relations which do not favour the community viz a viz state agencies, explain the ineffectiveness o f community 
institutions to regulate use. The orchestration o f a shift in the locus o f control in favour o f communities and institution 
building support programmes are identified as the ways forward.
Introduction
This article deals with how farmers protected tree 
resources in their arable plots and the communal 
woodlands in a newly settled communal area in 
Zimbabwe. The choice of the study area was guided 
by a need to find a locality with abundant woodland 
resources since the emergence and evolution of 
common property natural resource management 
regimes lacks attention in the literature on 
Zimbabwe. I was also familiar with Kanyati from 
previous research and it appeared appropriate 
because it had experienced spontaneous settlement 
from its former status as a forest frontier. The article 
concentrates on the management strategy with 
respect to rights over the trees and woodlands and 
the controls that were used. Investigation of the 
fostering of collective institutional arrangements was 
rooted in an anthropological frame of reference and 
related to both household and communal resources.
The data used in the paper comes from open- 
ended interviews with early settlers, a survey done 
under the auspices of the Agricultural and Rural
Development Authority (ARDA) and the Tsetse and 
Trypanosomiasis Control Board (TTCB), a sample 
survey of households, open-ended interviews with 
members of sampled households, key informant 
interviews and notes on community meetings held 
during the year of fieldwork I spent in Kanyati 
Communal Area.
The first section of this article describes the case 
study setting and looks at the important influences 
on the woodland management system that obtained 
in the area. It then describes household resource 
control strategies, household and cultural controls 
that werefbuttressed by extension advice and controls 
on communal resources. Control and regulatory 
capacity incorporates issues of local governance, 
struggles around demands for natural resources and 
land, and the role of community structures and 
governmental agencies in the area. All these issues 
are enmeshed in local political dynamics. I look 
critically at these local level processes.
Several distinctions were made following 
Fortmann (1987) who argues for a separation
1 Some insights in this paper have appeared in Nhira (1992a); Fortmann and Nhira (1992); Nhira and Fortmann (1993); Bruce, 
Fortmann and Nhira (1993); and Nhira (1994).
between planted trees and self-sown trees and the 
identification of the spaces on which the trees are 
found. First, a distinction is made between the 
controls that relate to planted trees, which in this 
case happen to be exotic fruit species and Eucalyptus 
trees planted at homesteads, and self-sown trees 
which are indigenous species found both at 
homesteads and in the main fields. Second, a 
distinction is made between indigenous fruit tree 
species and non-fruit bearing indigenous species 
which are found at homesteads and in the arable 
fields. The third distinction involves the controls that 
relate to the use of trees in the communal woodlands. 
These distinctions are akin to those arrived at by 
employing the concept of the tenure niche (Fortmann 
and Nhira, 1992). The concept was arrived at by 
expanding land tenure to include tree tenure. Tree 
tenure was defined as property claims to certain 
categories of trees by certain groups on land under 
various kinds of tenure (Fortmann and Nhira, 
1992:1). A tenure niche becomes the space where a 
property claim is made. Fortmann and Nhira 
(1992:2) identified six tenurial niches in Zimbabwe:
1. Forestland controlled by the state;
2. Trees controlled by District Councils on 
communal land;
3. Indigenous woodland in communal and 
resettlement areas;
4. Trees planted by groups and institutions;
5. Trees planted/protected by individuals on 
individually controlled land; and
6. Trees on commercial farms.
In this article, we are primarily dealing with two 
of the tenure niches i.e. numbers 3 and 5 above. 
Number 5 is refined further to take account of trees 
in main fields and trees on homesteads.
Given the deficiences in the woodland 
management system identified in Section One, 
Section Two attempts to explain why the 
communities were unable to organise themselves 
around the management of important common 
property resources as woodlands. From an 
institutional viewpoint, the management of 
woodland resources necessarily involves the 
intersection between the actions of individuals, 
households, community institutions and those of 
governmental agencies who might be located in the 
area. The second section of this article unravels 
state-local and local-local relations by investigating 
the interactions among community members (that is,
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those with rights of use over the resources) and 
between them and agents of the state (a la Berry 
1988; 1989; Peluso, 1992). Such interactions go 
beyond the realm of woodland management to 
dealing with land and other development goods 
which might be made available within the locality. 
Interactions within arena which may be somewhat 
removed from woodland management per se have 
important implications for woodland management as 
will be shown.
Several state-initiated community institutions 
which acted as power bases and served as channels 
of access to resources are discussed. The use of 
‘power’ became an important explanatoiy tool viz a 
viz the interactions between the range of actors. 
Power is defined as the ability to deploy authority 
(authoritative resources) and material resources 
(allocative resources) towards a given objective 
(Giddens, 1984). Four power bases were 
identified: 1) state based power, 2) ‘traditional’ 
power, 3) inter-household power (or community 
power) and 4) intra-household power. The article 
explores apparent resistance to initiatives emanating 
from these power bases, the narratives used and 
implications for woodland management.
The discussion in the second section of the article 
begins with how state power manifested itself. Three 
issues are taken up ie. land use provisions and land 
disputes^, extension, and project investment and 
distribution of benefits. A discussion of ‘traditional’ 
power then follows, particularly relating to its 
potential considering that it had been sidelined 
somewhat. Inter-household power is discussed with 
respect to the factors making for convergence or 
divergence of interest which were identified as 
economic differentiation, ethnicity, and lineage 
organization. A discussion of intra-household power 
then follows particularly focusing on differences in 
perceptions according to gender.
Land use planning and woodland management
2 McGregor (1991: Chapter 3) emphasizes the need to look 
at land-use in general as it is the most important cause and 
consequence of deforestation. Land disputes are important to 
consider because strategies of manipulating supply of trees by 
leaving fields uncleared until it is necessary to clear them 
would not be considered in the event there is a dispute. Instead 
there would be rampant clearing of land to reinforce 
ownership claims.
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The study area
Kanyati communal area is situated just before the 
escarpment overlooking the Zambezi valley in 
Mashonaland West province. It falls under 
Nyaminyami Rural District Council in Kariba 
district. It was used as a buffer tsetse fly control zone 
since 1954 and, thus, had been profoundly affected 
by human activity before the settlers arrived 
primarily through tsetse and trypanosomiasis control 
operations. Migration into the area began in 1982 
and was heaviest up to the mid-1980s. Government 
attention was drawn to the area by perceived threats 
to Lake Kariba and its environs which include an 
important national park and safari area. Government 
decisively intervened beginning in 1987.
Influences on the evolution of the 
management system
Four major influences on the evolution of the 
management system can be identified: the residual 
effects of the legislative and planning framework, 
the land use planning exercise carried out in 
Kanyati, the frontier status of the area, and the 
cultural cognition of the settlers.
There are several elements within the broad 
policy framework which adversely affect
management at local levels (Scoones and Matose 
(1993). Legislation in Zimbabwe still focusses on 
control and policing and so does not encourage local 
level management. Second, planning is sector based 
and technocratic so there is little support to local 
units of management. Third, there is little support 
from the forest authority, which remains
commercially oriented, does not cover the country 
adequately, and does not have the requisite extension 
packages for building local resource management 
institutions. Fourth, sub-district local authorities' 
power has been undermined to the extent that they 
have little legitimacy.
The land-use planning project in Kanyati was 
intended to focus on natural resources but this 
element tended to be neglected in the execution of 
the plan. Forestry was not tightly integrated into the 
land-use planning process. Yet land use planning 
has profound implications on the availability of 
woodland resources (McGregor, 1991).
The frontier status of the area has several
implications. First, people might have had intentions 
of finding enough space to create an idealized model 
of their areas of origin (Kopytoff, 1987). I will 
elaborate on this below. Second, people assumed that 
resources were abundant, which determined their 
behaviour, even though there was evidence to the 
contrary. Third, outsiders, who would have been 
looking for land to settle on well after the land use 
project had begun, assumed that there was enough 
space to accommodate them. Thus, there were 
problems of ‘squatting’ which led to the clearance of 
woodlands to establish fields and homes. Fourthly, 
neighbouring communal land residents used 
resources in Kanyati, the claims being based on prior 
usage rights.
Cultural cognition was expected to have two 
opposed implications. One, that since people carried 
a mental cultural model (of resource characteristics, 
how they can be used and for what, and the 
institutions which should be responsible for 
regulating use) it could be expected that there would 
only be some experimentation when the model did 
not fit the reality. On the other hand, since people 
had uprooted themselves from the hierarchical 
structures which conditioned their behaviour on 
migrating, culture might not have had much of an 
impact on the way they would conduct themselves in 
the new locality.
How all these elements came together in the 
study context is the subject of the two sections of the 
article.
SECTION ONE
Household resource control strategies
Fortmann (1987), Wilson (1987) and McGregor 
(1991) argue that labour sometimes creates rights (or 
rather that rights are justified by virtue of having 
invested labour), so we might expect that controls 
would be greatest where labour was invested. Table 1 
shows the locations where trees could be found on 
land controlled by households, the species of trees 
and the degree of control that was exercised.
Controls were greatest with regard to Eucalyptus 
and planted exotic fruit trees at homesteads followed 
in descending order by fruit-bearing indigenous 
species at homesteads, non-fruit-bearing indigenous 
species at homesteads, fruit-bearing indigenous
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Table 1: Location of trees grown/conserved, the species and 
________ degree of control exercised___________________
the
Location Species Degree of Control
Homestead Eucalyptus High
c Exotic Fruit High
t Indigenous Fruit Moderate
6 Non-Fruit Indigenous Moderate
Arable Indigenous Fruit Low
( Non-Fruit Indigenous Low
species in arable fields, and non-fruit-bearing 
indigenous trees in arable fields. A fair number of 
the homesteads were perimeter fenced. Interviewees 
who had not done so intended to fence off their 
homesteads in time. Moreover, there was usually 
somebody left at home to guard against intruders.
Seedlings and small plants of Eucalyptus and 
exotic fruit trees were often protected against 
domestic livestock and wildlife by fencing in the 
plants with twigs, grass and rope. Since the trees 
were invariably planted at homesteads, much care 
was taken of them including ensuring that the plants 
got the desired watering regime. Interviewees often 
assumed, when questioned about the controls they 
applied, that the question was focused on these 
particular species only. An array of views was 
expressed regarding the controls that could be 
applied to outsiders i.e. non-household members who 
wanted to use the resources. The details about these 
views are given below.
Eucalyptus trees tended to be under the direct 
control of the heads of households, who tended to be 
male. The mature trees were meant for sale and for 
household building projects. All the respondents who 
had planted Eucalyptus (10, N=44) pointed out that 
an unauthorized user would be brought before the 
Village Development Committee (VIDCO) where 
they would be asked to pay for the unauthorized 
cutting and/or use of the trees.
With regard to exotic fruit tree species, in some 
instances it was pointed out by the owners that those 
who asked would be granted permission to pick the 
fruit. It seemed though that the owners would not 
grant permission to pick fruit to an unknown person,
while a known local resident with whom 
reciprocity is applied in other spheres of social 
life would get permission to pick. Another 
— view expressed was that somebody picking 
fruit without permission would be cautioned 
not to do so again. Others expressed the view 
that the culprit picking fruit without 
permission would be brought before the 
VIDCO and asked to pay, especially if the 
fruit was meant for sale. Dining fieldwork 
only one household was observed to have 
started to sell exotic fruit from a home orchard 
to passers-by, who included school children. 
Notwithstanding these sentiments, not one 
case had been brought before the VIDCOs, 
suggesting that these controls were generally 
understood and adhered to or alternatively that the 
controls were not applied by the owners despite the 
owners' expressions of what they would do.
On their part, the VIDCO chairs emphasised that 
good neighbourliness demanded that nobody took or 
used what was not his or hers. They believed that 
most members of their community were good 
neighbours. It appeared that if litigation was brought 
before them concerning VIDCO residents they would 
take a mediatory approach. The approach would be a 
reflection of the Constitution of the community which 
allows for residents to respond to mediation. 
Lineages which had uprooted themselves from the 
same area of origin tended to live near each other, 
sometimes making up a whole village, hence being 
able to forge closer links amongst themselves.
Fruit-bearing indigenous trees far outnumbered 
non-fruit-bearing indigenous trees at the homesteads 
and in fields except in cases where a substantial part 
of the fields had not yet been cleared. Fruit-bearing 
indigenous trees at homesteads to some extent were 
viewed in the same light as sown exotic fruit trees. 
Attitudes regarding the controls tended to be along 
the same lines as those pointed out above for exotic 
fruit trees but with a greater leeway being given for 
access by others to the fruit. For example, no 
mention was made of seeking redress through the 
VIDCOs for the unauthorised taking of indigenous 
fruit. Indigenous fruit was not widely sold in the 
locality, perhaps due to its prevalence, neither was it 
exported outside the locality.
Opinions about the controls applied to fruit- 
bearing indigenous trees left in the fields varied from 
‘I do not care because I did not plant the trees’, to 
access would be denied during the agricultural
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season for fear that the crops would be trampled. 
Some trees fruit during the dry season so there is no 
threat of the crops being trampled. Other 
interviewess expressed the opinion that trees in fields 
are just the same as crops and, therefore, belong 
exclusively to the household. The latter opinion was 
more prevalent. This latter opinion is corroborated 
by McGregor (1991:314/5) who points out that 
‘apart from the fruit, other products from trees 
located in fields or in home yards are not common 
property’ and that ‘generally there has been a shift to 
greater use of resources which are increasingly 
regarded as privatised, as land pressure increases’. 
Most households practically lived in their fields 
during the wet season, only returning to the 
homesteads at night and, therefore, they could be 
able to monitor tree use in the fields by other people. 
Monitoring tree usage could even be done at night in 
VIDCOs close to the game area, where people would 
sleep overnight, along with guarding their crops 
against wildlife depredations. However, other people 
could harvest the fruit without asking during the dry 
season. Notwithstanding, residents of other villages 
might be seen as encroaching on a resource they 
were not entitled to.
Some non-fruit indigenous trees such as 
Pseudolachnostylis maprouneifolia and Pterocarpus 
angolensis which were associated with 
sacred/ritualistic significance and occured at 
homesteads were not cut as doing so was seen as a 
bad omen for the household. Since trees were in 
plentiful supply, it was not usual for other 
community members to find it necessary to collect 
dry wood or to cut trees standing in somebody else's 
fields. The same applied to other gathering activities 
such as for grass. In one instance, an informant 
complained that a neighbour had cut trees for poles 
to construct a granary in an uncleared part of his 
fields. The complainant intended to approach the 
neighbour about the issue and to warn him not to do 
it again. On his part, the plaintif pointed out that he 
had not been aware that the area in which he had cut 
constituted a part of the complainant's fields. In this 
instance the cutting of trees was of sufficient worry 
to warrant some animosity between neighbours.
Memories of ecological stress in community 
members' areas of origin served to stress the 
importance of resources that were directly under the
control of the household as can be seen from the 
above discussion. There was the use of both physical 
fences and ‘social fences’ in the control of outsiders 
for resources that were directly under the household3 4, 
details of which were provided above. There was 
widespread disappointment with community efforts 
that had been made with regard to the control of 
communal woodland resources (see below).
Household and cultural controls 
buttressed by extension advice
Unlike the institutional forms of control which will 
be discussed below where there was some threat of 
prosecution, household and cultural controls 
buttressed by extension advice were voluntary i.e. 
they were recommendations made by state extension 
services through their local resource overseers and 
VIDCOs to farmers. These recommendations relied 
on the predisposition of the farmer to adhere to 
them.
A number of recommendations were made to 
farmers by Agricultural, Technical and Extension 
Services (Agritex) and ARDA extension staff. One 
was that farmers build brick houses. The 
recommendation arose from a perception that 
building brick houses might lead to a reduction in 
the use of wood in the long run''. Secondly, farmers 
were enjoined not to clear their arable land until 
such time as they would want to use it, thereby 
maintaining the quality of the soil and avoiding wind 
erosion. Thirdly, it was recommended that farmers 
should not cut fruit trees or ringbark and bum trees 
in fields3. Rather, they were commended to clear
3 The terms ‘physical and social fences’ are borrowed firm 
Fortmann (n.d.)
4 McGregor’s (1991) discussion about differences in wood 
used for brick and wooden houses points out that while total 
volumes are less for brick houses, the type of wood used (often 
whole, living trees are cut down to fire brick kilns) is far more 
destructive of woodlands than the harvesting of wood for 
constructing pole and dagga huts. For the latter, the trees 
generally coppice.
3 Ring-baiking and burning was mainly practised by those 
households which experienced labour deficiences, so there 
was the need to minimise labour inputs. For the others, it was
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trees in the fields only when the need to use the land 
for agriculture arose and then to gather the trees cut 
for future use. Fourthly, farmers were commended to 
leave trees standing in areas which would not be 
planted such as field drains.
The control of use of communal 
woodlands
Cultural forms o f control
Kanyati was characterised by the near absence of 
sacred controls enforced by customary institutions 
and practices as defined by Nhira and Fortmann 
(1993). Nhira and Fortmann (1993) distinguish 
between several types of controls. Sacred controls are 
defined as norms of tree use and protection that are 
based in folk or ‘traditional’ religious belief and that 
are enforced by individual internalisation of the 
norms, community sanction or by religious and/or 
‘traditional’ leaders. Pragmatic controls are 
‘traditional’ and recently adopted norms of tree use 
and protection that are designed to ensure a steady 
flow of a particular product. The civil contract are 
norms of civility that govern daily conduct and 
which restrain excessively avaricious behaviour. 
Parts of the contract can be reinforced by religious 
mores and norms but they are not generally thought 
of as being ‘religious’. All these controls have been 
lumped together here as cultural controls. 
‘Customary’ and ‘traditional’ are used advisedly 
here. They do not imply something static and 
unchanging but something that could be innovative 
and a rational response to perceived or potential 
scarcity firmly rooted in the culture.
The few sacred controls that were observed by 
households were maintained in the absence of 
recognised ‘traditional’ institutions. Unlike other 
communal areas which might have had ‘traditional’ 
religious cults, the institution was supplanted by 
administrative fiat in Kanyati*5 6. ‘Traditional’ 
authority was unrecognised in resettlement areas as 
well.
because people did not see the need to conserve wood for 
future use since supplies of dry wood were plentiful in the 
area.
6 This issue will be treated more extensively in the section 
below -when ‘traditional’ power viz-a-viz other power bases is
discussed.
Notwithstanding, some households did not use 
certain tree species because of their ritualistic 
significance eg. Pseudolachnostylis maprouneifolia. 
These species could still be cut eg. when clearing 
fields so the fact that they could not be used after 
being cut did not preclude their being cut. However, 
residents also pointed out that they only cut trees 
when they intended to use them and so would not 
normally cut a tree for which there was no use except 
when clearing fields. The idea that a tree was only 
cut for a purpose has been linked to the fact that 
settlers wanted to show that they were stewards of 
the land, particularly to an outsider (Nhira and 
Fortmann, 1993). This cognitive set also applied to 
indigenous fruit trees.
Indigenous fruit trees such as Berchemia discolor 
and Diospyros mespiliformis which occurred in large 
quantities in the area were not cut except in the 
process of clearing fields. Other trees were not used 
because of their burning properties. Residents 
pointed out that they did not need to cut down live 
trees for fuelwood7 because of the plentiful supplies 
of dead wood available from road cutting, field 
clearance and normal tree mortality. Wood was 
gathered on a first come first served basis in Kanyati, 
unlike in other settings where prior claims could be 
made to fuelwood by gathering it together and 
leaving it for later collection (Nhira and Fortmann, 
1993). Such controls arise from a combination of 
common sense and preference.
The above mentioned controls were brought with 
the settlers from their areas of origin as part of a 
cognitive set embedded in the culture (or more 
crudely cultural baggage). In this sense a frontier can 
be a force for cultural-historical continuity and 
conservatism (Kopytoff, 1987). The existence of the 
cultural controls suggests that immigrants had come 
with a mental cultural ideal which they wanted to 
establish had it not been for state intervention.
The new institutional controls
There were a number of institutions responsible for 
monitoring woodland usage and, more generally, 
natural resource use in Kanyati. Their history did not 
span more than the life of the land use project. 
Common characteristics to all the institutions were 
that they were imposed on the community either by
7 McGregor (1991) notes that women prefer deadwood and 
will go to great pains to collect it even when it is scarce.
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the project or by other government bodies and that 
they all depended on the VIDCOs to execute the 
functions. The VIDCOs had also been imposed on 
the community at the time the decision to rationalise 
land use and settlement was made.
The Department of Natural Resources 
approached the District Council with a view to 
exhorting Kanyati residents to preserve their 
environment just after the earliest in-migrants had 
settled in Kanyati in 1982. Initially, meetings were 
held with the residents and the process culminated in 
the election of unpaid natural resource overseers 
(majengetavhu) in each of the ten VIDCOs, with 
each VIDCO having two or three resource overseers. 
These resource overseers were further trained outside 
the community in methods of conservation. They 
monitored resource use and advised ward councillors 
and VIDCOs on what action to take in cases of 
infringements of ‘laid down procedures’ of woodland 
use. The laid down procedures were unwritten and 
thus open to various interpretations. The councillors 
could take the issues up with the District Council 
Conservation Committee constituted under the 
Natural Resources Act and the District Councils Act. 
District conservation committees have conservation 
and control functions (Murphree, 1992). Natural 
resource overseers also liaised with the Department 
of Natural Resources' natural resource officers based 
at the provincial headquarters with respect to their 
extension and control functions. Natural resource 
officers and the District Council's conservation 
committee can make an order for the provisions of 
the Act to be complied with (Section 75 sub-section 
1). However, natural resource officers made 
infrequent visits to Kanyati. They were encountered 
once during the year-long period of field research. 
They were in Kanyati over a period of three days 
showing films on tree planting and monitoring the 
removal of cotton stumps from farmers' fields.
Two ward wildlife committees had been formed 
in Kanyati through the initiative of the Nyaminyami 
District Wildlife Management Trust (NDWMT), an 
arm of the District Council responsible for wildlife 
management in the whole district. However, the 
essential components of the CAMPFIRE
programme® had not yet been established at the time 
fieldwork ended. The two committees were 
responsible to the wards, their constituencies in 
addition to serving the NDWMT. Proposals had been 
made to establish a joint wildlife management 
committee above the two wildlife committees since 
the wildlife area from which benefits would flow was 
in one block (Murphree, 1992). The NDWMT 
appointed game guards who were to be responsible 
for Kanyati. Their duties entailed educating people 
on the need to conserve forests, Soil, water and 
wildlife; control of problem animals; assessing crop 
damages; control of snaring, hunting and fishing; 
game cropping and the sale of the meat as 
communicated to Kanyati residents* 5. The 
relationship between natural resource overseers and 
game guards had not been discussed among 
community members nor had the relationship 
between the conservation committee and the ward 
wildlife committees. Ward wildlife committees 
embrace conservation, management and exploitative 
responsibilities unlike the conservation committees 
(Murphree, 1992). By-laws to govern the operations 
of the ward wildlife committees were still being 
discussed when fieldwork ended.
The wildlife management programme was likely 
to be the lead programme in the local context in the 
management of natural resources since wildlife had 
much more economic value than the other natural 
resources found in the area. Murombedzi (1992a) 
offered a critique on how the CAMPFIRE 
programme had been orchestrated by the 
Nyaminyami District Council, under which Kanyati 
falls, since its inception. His main argument is that 
control over the programme had been retained by the 
district council without it filtering to the local level. 
The same could be expected to have applied to 
Kanyati in due course even though not much had 
been done on the ground in Kanyati70. In its attempt
8 Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources, Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Management (Martin, 1986).
5 ARDA extension worker at Ward A meeting 18/8/90.
10 NDWMT conducted workshops on revenue handling and 
rule formulation for game management apart from the 
formation of ward wildlife committees and the disbursement
to deal with the problem of control remaining at 
district level, the Department of National Parks and 
Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) issued a set of 
guidelines which sought to force district councils to 
devolve authority at least to the wards on pain of 
having their appropriate authority status withdrawn.
Other institutions which were likely to affect the 
management ,of woodlands were the proposed 
VIDCO grazing and livestock management 
committees which would have fallen under the 
control of the VIDCOs (ARDA, 1987:65). The 
demarcation of grazing areas, which approximated 
the areas of woodland cover, had been completed. 
Fencing of the grazing areas started in 1994. The 
committees were to be responsible for maintaining 
cattle "handling facilities and stock water dams, 
notification of livestock diseases, controlling the 
number of herds per plotholder, changing paddocks 
and simple veld management. Community members 
had been enthusiastic in contributing labour towards 
the fencing of the grazing areas not least because of 
anticipated savings on herding time. However, the 
process under which the grazing areas and paddocks 
were demarcated was typically technocratic and top- 
down. VIDCOs were shown the demarcated 
boundaries by extension personnel after the 
boundaries had been demarcated using land use 
maps. Boundaries were negotiated with the VIDCOs 
only when some arable land was unwittingly 
included within the grazing area, at which point the 
plotholder was offered land elsewhere by the VIDCO 
or if that was not possible then the project undertook 
to fence in the affected arable land.
The VIDCOs were initiated simultaneously with 
land reorganisation. Initially, the former emergent 
sabhukus were transformed into temporary VIDCOs 
at the instigation of the District Administration. 
Eventually, the positions were made elective. In 
essence a fundamental shift had been made from the 
‘traditional’ authorities to new institutions in 
keeping with administrative policy directions issued 
at the time. At the same time people had to move 
from where they had chosen to settle initially to the 
plots that had been demarcated.
A number of factors can be isolated which made
8
of revenue. The workshops also dealt with the use of trees and 
grass, the adjudication of land disputes and the control of 
squatting. The sessions did not go beyond what is reported in 
this article in terms of the control functions.
land reorganisation and relocations possible. The 
immigrants were aware that they did not have 
government blessing when they settled in Kanyati, so 
they welcomed the legitimation that land 
reorganisation provided. Second, they had not been 
resident in the area for a long time (three years in 
the case of the earliest settlers) and so would not 
have built durable structures and cleared up much 
land to make moving again difficult. Third, the 
experience of negotiating for a home had been so 
recent that they could to do it again if they were not 
to abandon any claims to a piece of land. Fourth, the 
earliest settlers had complaints against the way 
settlement had occurred prior to land reorganisation 
particularly regarding continued influx of people 
onto a diminishing resource which the nascent 
sabhukus and Hurungwe77 chiefs were encouraging 
as they were receiving payment from each settler. 
Immigrants had to pay Z$10.50 each for the 
allocation of a plot. Fifth, the land use project came 
with promises of additional resources for 
improvement of agriculture and the building of 
infrastructure such as roads and clinics which 
persuaded the settlers to go along with it. In the 
words of one settler:
‘We accepted the 'squatter' label because 
we knew we were haphazardly settled.
When Agritex came in and the District 
Administrator began moving around 
we knew government had accepted the 
idea that we should settle here 
permanently. Then the government 
entered into a $6,5 million agreement 
on our behalf and started arranging 
things for us. We knew we had been 
accepted when we eventually got land 
registration forms. This ensured that 
more people would not come into the 
area’72.
Acceptance" of project intervention however 
masked deeply held opinions about the intrusive 
nature of the intervention. For example, those Who 
had to move from more fertile fields to less fertile 
ones and those who had staked larger portions of 
land than was eventually distributed were
Land use planning and woodland management
77 Hurungwe is the neighbouring communal area to the east 
of Kanyati.
12 Interview with Mr.Masara, Nyadara Video 20/8/90.
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disappointed. In addition, none of the settlers were 
compensated for the labour they had put into 
clearing the land and whatever structures they might 
have built up to that stage. This was a basis for 
confrontation between the original claimants and 
those subsequently settled on the land. Others moved 
out of Kanyati because of the unavailability of land 
and disappointment with state interference. Non­
residents lost their claims. However, government 
officials who were in the forefront of demarcating 
and distributing land were prepared to consider land 
exchanges among the settlers to ease the burden of 
shifting around. In some sense, therefore, there was 
a limited choice about where one could settle and 
with whom; hence some lineages were clustered 
together. In other instances, the arable fields that had 
been staked out on arrival in Kanyati were 
authenticated by the land use project but people had 
to move their homes to new sub-village sites. Those 
who had settled in the demarcated game area had to 
abandon their claims. Some of them secured land 
elsewhere in the project area.
The sense of community was still developing in 
these new villages. Most of the residents were 
Shona, although belonging to different Shona sub- 
groupings. The nature of the Shona kinship system 
allowed for people who would otherwise not be 
related to build a close relationship eg. relationships 
could be built on the basis of totems. These nominal 
relationships might be buttressed by the demands of 
proximity such as material exchanges, co-operation 
in ritual matters, inter-household work parties, inter­
marriages and other community efforts eg. building 
schools, worshipping together, in formers' groups, 
etc. Colson (1971) has shown the inclusive nature of 
kinship through the use of one or another device of 
Active kinship, ritual innovation in the face of a 
breakdown in relationships and the use of religion as 
a way of coping with damage to social relationships. 
I had occasion to observe instances where the 
solidarity that had been built up was shown. For 
example, people would no longer refer to their areas 
of origin as ‘home’ but would instead disparage bad 
conditions in their areas of origin. School children 
would sing about what a beautifiil part of Zimbabwe
they would inherit73.
It is however, these same forces identified above 
(ie. village alignment, kinship and other 
relationships) that tended to divide people in the 
direction of emphasizing membership of specific 
groups such as VIDCOs, sub-villages, ethnic groups, 
the rich and the poor, and hence to develop 
cleavages as a way of maintaining identifying 
markers or boundaries in custom or otherwise (cf ^  
Colson, 1971:65).
Some authority on land allocation and arbitration 
of disputes had been turned over to VIDCOs. Still, 
they were passive actors in the land reorganisation 
exercise, except when they exhorted people to follow 
the land use guidelines. They possessed authority 
over the control and use of woodlands since they 
were the bodies through which the District Council 
could delegate its authority. In doing so they worked 
in close collaboration with the natural resource 
overseers, the game guards, and the ward wildlife 
committees which should be seen as organs of the 
VIDCOs.
Below are the normative statements of rules that 
were made by the VIDCOs with respect to the 
controls in the use of woodlands. The normative 
requirement before one could cut a tree outside of 
one's fields was for one to seek permission from both 
the resource overseer and the VIDCO chair, both of 
whom would advise on the best methods of cutting 
and where cutting could be done depending on 
availability and the amount desired. Residents were 
not to ring bark trees in the woodlands to use in 
making bee-hives. They were not to cut down trees 
near river banks. They were also not allowed to cut 
down fruit trees. The VIDCO reserved the right to 
call the person concerned to appear before it to 
account for his/her actions in cases of infringements.
These normative statements of rules did not stand 
up to scrutiny in their application. Consultation was 
seen as a contingency measure for when the situation 
got worse in Chitete VIDCO7* Only non-VIDCO 
residents needed to consult the VIDCO. VIDCO 134
13 Tobacco field day rendition of Kanyati MushaWakanaka 
(Kanyati is a beautifiil place) by the Makande School Choir 
26/2/91.
14 Interview with Mr.Chasara, VIDCO chair, 7/8/90.
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residents did not seek permission in the VIDCOs 
sharing a border with Hurungwe communal area, ie. 
Kanyati, Nyadara, Chitete and Hwamira, primarily 
because Hurungwe residents also used the resources 
without seeking permission (see below). Outsiders 
had to seek permission to cut bamboo in Hurenje 
VIDCO. The bamboo was used for making mats and 
was unavailable in other VIDCOs74. The general 
view in Makande VIDCO was that the woodlot 
Eucalyptus trees should mature first before controls 
on tree cutting could be effected74. Residents of the 
other VIDCOs were of the view that the greatest 
saving of trees could be achieved through no further 
clearance of land for agriculture, hence the greatest 
need was perceived to be control of further in- 
migration.
In reality, therefore, residents of Kanyati 
VIDCOs could cut trees in their VIDCOs without 
seeking permission. VIDCOs which did not share a 
boundary with Hurungwe communal area were 
successful in controlling outsiders (ie. non-Video 
Kanyati residents) from using their resource. A case 
was reported of Colophospermum mopane poles 
being confiscated in Nyajena VIDCO. The control of 
non-Kanyati residents for VIDCOs sharing a 
boundary with Hurungwe was particularly
problematic. Hurungwe residents claimed that they 
had always used the resources in Kanyati even before 
the present Kanyati residents were living in the area. 
These claims were supported by former Hurungwe 
residents incorporated into the project area. A power 
struggle developed between what were generically 
referred to as ‘Karangas’ (the VIDCO chair was 
Karanga) and ‘Korekores’ (former Hurungwe 
residents) in one VIDCO, Hwamira, with the latter 
not attending meetings and not wanting to be bound 
by the decisions of the committee until they had 
wrested power from the other faction77.
Normative sanctions that were reported could be 
applied by the VIDCOs varied from one VIDCO to 
the other. The chair of Hurenje VIDCO was of the 
opinion that if it came to the crunch they could evict
75 Hurenje Group meeting 8/8/90.
16 Makande VIDCO group meeting 16/8/90.
77 All immigrants tend to be referred to as Karangas
because the biggest sending area is South Central Zimbabwe 
where Karangas are concentrated.
a recalcitrant resident by recommending to the 
District Council through the councillor that such a 
course of action be taken78. The sanctions that could 
be prescribed in other VIDCOs were extra work at 
the schools, in the construction of paddocks and in 
the woodlots. Fines in the order of $50 for a fruit tree 
and $25 for any other tree could be imposed in 
Hwamira75 *.
VIDCOs could use their discretion in deciding 
what punishment to mete out. The offender could 
appeal to the District Council if he/she found the 
punishment to be excessive. Only two cases were 
taken up by the VIDCOs during the research period. 
The one case occurred in Hurenje and involved a 
case reported to the VIDCO by the resource overseer 
of somebody who had cut trees along the river bank. 
No punishment was meted out as no precedent had 
been set70. The other case occurred in Nyajena 
VIDCO where 180 Colophospermum mopane trees 
were cut by an outsider. It was not clear whether the 
resource overseer had given his permission but the 
VIDCO chair had declined to give his. On 
examination it turned out that project management 
had overruled the VIDCO chair because the poles 
were needed for the construction of a tobacco bam77. 
In general, however, resource overseers and VIDCO 
chairs did not appear to be prepared to interfere with 
other residents' survival strategies and risk souring 
relationships when they were not paid for their 
trouble. They chose instead to rely on ‘management 
by exhortation’, an integral part of community 
building.
Project management premised their interventions 
on the basis that management of existing woodlands 
would not offset future wood deficits. They thus 
emphasised afforestation through woodlots and 
agroforestry practices. This was done despite the 
project document identifying localised overcutting as 
a risk (ARDA, 1987:67). Thus no support was being 
given to the VIDCOs in their efforts to control 
woodland use. Project management did not
78 Mr.Mavhuna, VIDCO chair, 8/8/90.
19 Mr.Masvosvere, VIDCO chair, 23/8/90.
70 Hurenje VIDCO meeting 21/11/90.
77 Interview with Mr.Vengai, Nyajena VIDCO chair, 
16/8/90.
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appreciate that agroforestry, as they had defined it, 
was most unlikely to have an impact as marked as 
minor changes in the management of existing 
woodlands.
Resource overseers and some ordinary VIDCO 
residents expressed disappointment with community 
efforts aimed at controlling use and expressed the 
need for the application of the above sanctions since 
people had been ‘educated’ and most had finished 
building their homes. This was echoed particularly 
in interviews with women. Suggestions were made 
that resource overseers should be paid monthly 
wages, that government should take the initiative by 
selling poles at the rural service centre, and that 
game guards should arrest those who cut trees 
without permission22. Mrs. Masvisvi was adamant 
that:
‘We cannot do it ourselves (ie. control 
cutting). We will not stop cutting trees 
even if the government tells us not to 
no matter how much talking is done.
They should arrest those who keep 
cutting’.
Such sentiments criticise the way VIDCOs were 
handling the issue. These sentiments also appeal for 
the services of the largesse of the state. They reflect 
people's perceptions of the limits of community 
control in a situation of plenty, where conservation 
might not be a priority for everybody except to some 
concerned individuals. In the context of this case- 
study the issues needed more thorough treatment in 
order to be able to explain why things were as they 
were by looking at how the state permeates and 
reshapes the local arena.
SECTION TWO
In order to explain the ineffectiveness of community 
institutions in controlling woodland use, there is 
need to address the factors determining the 
inconsistencies related to non-application and/or 
differential application of rules and controls among 
community members in Kanyati. I attempt to do this 
below, focusing not on legislative and other macro-
22 Interviews with Mrs. Miriam Shumba 15/1/91, Mrs. 
AuxiliaMavhuna 16/1/91 and Mrs. Enis Masvisvi 21/1/91.
institutional limitations23 24, but on the arena of local 
action. As pointed out above, I look at the range of 
loci of power exhibited within the local arena, how 
that power is used and the implications for woodland 
management.
State power
The pervasiveness of state power in the project area 
is dealt with below to show that the communities had 
little leeway for taking initiatives. In part this reason 
might account for the communities taking little 
action with regard to the management of woodlands. 
Below I also highlight the preoccupations of state 
agencies which did not concern themselves with 
woodland management yet many of the components 
of the project had implications for the status of 
woodlands. In addition, the differential impacts of 
the project led to community segmentation which 
compromised community cohesiveness, a factor 
which is critical to community organisation around 
the management of common property natural 
resources.
State power in the project area was represented 
by extension personnel, district administration, the 
district council, project management and the various 
institutions emanating from the Prime Minister's 
Directive on Provincial Administration and 
Provincial Governorships of 1984 ie. the Videos. In 
theory development plans were to be channelled up 
the hierarchy of development committees where 
choices would be made about what should be 
implemented and in turn channelled down the 
hierarchy for their implementation. In practice the 
lowest structure mentioned above did not have 
budgets nor were they legal persona, therefore their 
plans did not usually see the light of day2*. VIDCOs 
should more appropriately be seen as agents of the 
state because they had little autonomous action 
beyond serving as conduits for ideas emanating from 
the state hierarchy although they were comprised of 
local residents (Murombedzi, 1992b). The political 
ties of VIDCOs to the state had left them dependent
23 These issues have been the subject of other studies eg. 
Scoones and Matose (1993).
24 See de Valk and Wekwete (1990) for an extended 
treatment of these structures.
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(Scoones and Matose, 1993). Community leaders did 
react to state manoeuvres, just as ordinary 
community members did, by manipulating state 
power for their own ends. However, ‘development’ 
goods were a monopoly of the project and by 
extension, the state, made possible through external 
donor funding. So, state power, in so far as it relates 
to the project, will be discussed below in relation to 
three local issue areas: land use provisions, 
extension, and project investment and distribution of 
benefits.
Since resources were being channelled through a 
state agency, project management wished to operate 
in a depoliticized environment. Management 
succeeded in co-opting people into strategizing 
around the capture of development goods to a large 
extent, although oppositional forces could be 
detected. These oppositional forces had not solidified 
in the frontier society that was unfolding, which 
enabled the government bureaucracy and the project 
to fill the institutional vacuum.
Land use provisions
Squatting and land disputes were contentious issues 
in the project area because land demarcation by the 
land use planning project was superimposed on the 
then existing land use practices. Squatting and land 
disputes led to uncontrolled clearance of woodlands.
Residents who had cleared more land than was 
subsequently allocated to them were unwilling to 
part with it. Non-Kanyati residents still regarded the 
area as a frontier and wanted to claim rights to land 
in the area. The typical intervention strategy to settle 
the disputes was for Video chairs and councillors to 
call in extension workers when they had failed to 
mediate satisfactorily themselves. Extension workers 
intervened on the presumption that if the disputants 
were shown their boundaries as reflected on the land 
use maps, then the disputants would heed the advice 
of extension workers. Often the advice of extension 
workers was taken, but in several instances it was 
not, mainly because the amount of land cleared was 
so extensive that the original settlers were loathe to 
give it up. The District Administration was called in 
to arbitrate if extension workers failed to mediate. 
District Administration claimed to act on behalf of 
the District Council which is the authority with legal 
jurisdiction over the area, as per the provisions of the 
Communal Lands Act 1982 and the District 
Councils Act 1980 (and as updated). VIDCO chairs 
and councillors stayed out of the more intractable
disputes until District Administration had reached a 
conclusion on the matter. Local leaders feared 
inadequate legal protection should their intervention 
result in violence as happened several times when 
the District Administration intervened.
District Administration used a ‘development’ 
discourse in the first instance in their intervention 
style. This entailed appealing to the disputants in a 
manner that emphasised rationality of the land use 
plan and the obfuscating nature of disputes for other 
development plans. District Administration 
threatened the protagonists with eviction from the 
project area when the disputes continued. 
Councillors and VIDCO chairs enjoined people _not 
to go against government regulations as people 
would ultimately suffer as a way of backing the 
stance taken by District Administration. In such 
instances councillors and VIDCO chairs would be 
alluding to the perceived control/influence that the 
District Administration had on disbursement of 
funds for the project. Extension personnel usually 
fell back on blaming the community leadership ie. 
the councillors and VIDCO chairs for not knowing 
their duties or for being hesitant to make decisions. 
Extension personnel, however, tended to keep 
themselves out of the more volatile disputes to avoid 
them interfering with their extension function. 
Having intervened, successfully or not, District 
administration usually ended up reinforcing the idea 
that in fact VIDCOs and councillors should be able 
to resolve issues concerning the community on their 
own. The dilemma facing community representatives 
was that they were made accountable to both 
technical and administrative staff of the project and 
to their electorate. The expectations of the two often 
did not coincide.
There was resistance by individual community 
members against the intervention of the District 
Administration. Resistance took the form of 
litigation against eviction. The settlers concerned 
remained in the project area in spite of the District 
Administration's desire to have them evicted. The 
project withdrew its services from areas widely- 
affected by such disputes on the assumption that the 
District Administration was still pursuing eviction of 
the settlers^. Community leaders often confronted 25
25 The magistrate's court, the high court and the supreme 
court all ruled in favour of the state. However, the District 
administration seem to have shelved plans to evict the settlers
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District Administration with a request that a 
conclusion be reached so that amends could be made 
with the settlers involved to enable ‘development’ 
activities to continue.
District Administration were more successful in 
evicting squatters who were new arrivals than in 
evicting long term settlers. The eviction of these 
squatters was a constant reminder to settlers and 
community leaders that the control over land by the 
District Council did not address community concerns 
even though some concessions had been made. Local 
people began manoevering to wrest some power from 
the District Council and the District Administration 
over land allocation because of untoward practices by 
the District Council. The District Council would 
allocate vacated plots to strangers rather than to 
landless community members. Led by the 
councillors, the community pointed out to 
administrative staff at local community meetings 
that the turnaround period between the council being 
informed about a vacant plot and actual allocation 
was unnecessarily long and that the practice of 
allocating plots to strangers was unfair to locals. The 
community was assured that in future VIDCO chairs 
and councillors would allocate land and that any 
further land use planning would respect the old plans 
and would not involve the shifting of people2*.
Local people and their leaders appeared to favour 
disguising the disruptiveness of land disputes and 
were deploying what Rose (1992:4) has termed 
harmony ideologies. The disputants involved were 
concerned with protecting and promoting their land 
use interests, while the state functionaries were 
concerned with maintaining their relative power and 
control over the land use project. It was only after 
sustained appeals that the District Administration 
and the District Council informally devolved their 
authority to elected bodies (ie. YIDCQs) within the 
project area on the crucial matter of land settlement.
Surprisingly, a regime of rigid control over land 
settlement was coupled with a laissez faire attitude 26
because of the time 'which had elapsed since the final 
judgement (Kanyati Communal Land File, D.A Kariba).
26 Proceedings of the Workshop on Wildlife and 
Institutional Developments in Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
Communal Lands, Kariba, 1/4/92.
to the use of trees- and woodlands even though the 
District Council could invoke the Natural Resources 
Act, The Communal Forest Produce Act, the 
Communal Land (Model) (Land Use and 
Conservation) By-Laws of 1985 and associated- 
legislation. The laissez faire attitude taken by the 
state with regard to woodlands in the study area 
provided some limited space for the nascent local 
institutions to attempt to manage the resources as 
was discussed in Section One. Such attempts were 
made without the support of project resources.
Extension
The provision of extension services tended to favour 
some farmers to the exclusion of others. The content 
of extension messages did not emphasise 
management of natural resources nor was conserva­
tion a priority in the farmers' own perceptions. 
Extension activities also tended to support activities 
that relied on the exploitation of woodlands eg. 
tobacco growing which requires the building of 
bams from wood. No effort was made to control such 
exploitation of woodlands by tobacco growing 
farmers leading to other farmers being unwilling to 
live by the rules imposed by the VIDCOs. Thus the 
extension mode followed also led to segmentation of 
the communities living little room for community 
effort.
Extension services were geared towards cash 
cropping, especially cotton and burley tobacco. 
Attention was to be given to soya beans and 
horticulture in the future. Cotton and burley tobacco 
tended to be grown by the better off farmers because 
they were labour intensive and involved relatively 
high input costs.
Extension activities took the form of extension 
meetings (or extension messages being passed on at 
other community meetings), visits by extension 
workers to farms, master farmer training courses, 
and demonstrations and trials, some of which were 
held on-farm. Selection criteria favoured those who 
were literate, had time available, had status in the 
community and were ‘innovators’ (cf _ Zwart, 
1990:25/26).
In Ward A, 125 of the 325 plotholders had 
acquired master farmer certificates, some since they 
had settled in Kanyati, while others had acquired the 
training in their areas of origin. The project was 
training at the rate of ten farmers per Video per
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annum (100 farmers per annum). Parts of the 
courses focussed on the creation of new supplies of 
tree products such as establishing woodlots and 
orchards rather than on managing existing 
woodlands.
Results of a survey conducted by ARDA and 
TTCB (1990:47) show' that 60% of farmers had 
attended at least one or more extension meetings a 
month. In descending order, farmers needed more 
information on crops, livestock, transport, health, 
education, water, conservation and wildlife 
management. Thus, issues of conservation and 
management of natural resources took low priority in 
the fanners' own perceptions compared to other 
needs. 14% of the sampled households in the above 
survey reported that they had been visited by 
extension workers at least once dining the 1990/91 
agricultural season. The better off farmers reported 
more than one visit while the bulk of farmers did not 
report any. Extension was, therefore, unevenly 
spread, a situation confirmed by my own 
observations reported below.
At any one extension meeting men usually 
outnumbered women. The reasons for this are 
multiple. Extension workers were men; there were 
high levels of illiteracy among women; and women 
carried a considerable burden of work around the 
home and were not able to attend meetings (cf 
Zwart, 1990:28). Men tended to live at home in 
Kanyati possibly because it was a newly settled area 
in which male labour was required for heavy tasks 
such as clearing land, a situation unlike in other 
communal areas where there is heavy male labour 
migration. Moreover, male involvement in the 
process of migration to Kanyati implied that male 
members of households had no altema- 
tive/competing demands and, therefore, were more 
committed to staying on the land than in other 
communal areas.
Demonstrations and trials are best illustrated by 
the introduction of burley tobacco into the project 
area. The point also illustrates the increase in 
demands made on the woodland resource from 
cropping patterns encouraged by the project. Burley 
tobacco growing started during the 1990/91 
agricultural season with 14 volunteer farmers who 
received all the inputs required, including transport 
for marketing the crop. Farmers pocketed all the 
revenue and were supposed to continue on their own 
after that initial boost. The project then took on 14 
other farmers during the next season. It was
expecting to continue at that rate presumably until 
its withdrawal from the area.
Tobacco growing necessitated the building of 
tobacco curing bams and grading sheds. Each bam 
needed at least 222 poles and each grading shed 18 
poles. Farmers selected hard woods for these 
purposes, with Colophospermum mopane being the 
favoured species. If each pole were to represent a tree 
felled, then 240 trees would be felled by one farmer 
to construct a bam and a shed. The prize winning 
tobacco farmer during the 1990/91 season was 
expected to need at least 2 more bams in addition to 
the one he had finished building for his 1,5 acre 
crop. No suggestions were made for these farmers to 
obtain their materials from elsewhere such as buying 
treated poles. The farmers involved maintained that 
other community members were allowed to cut trees 
for logs to be used in beer brewing, so they believed 
they were morally in the right by cutting trees in 
such numbers for their tobacco bams. There were, 
thus, disagreements between community members on 
the appropriate woodland use levels.
The extension worker-project staff-farmer 
interface had many similarities to the forester-farmer 
relation described by Peluso (1992:418-431) in 
relation to forestry extension in Java where 
connections were made with villagers through the 
formal administrative leaders or through informal 
leaders who tended to be the more wealthy farmers. 
These leaders prevail on farmers to do what the 
government wants them to do. Peluso points out that 
it was difficult for the forester (read extension 
worker) to bypass the patrons as the state had 
extended its power and influence down to the village 
level (in Zimbabwe's case through the VIDCOs) such 
that if the extension workers did not succumb, the 
patron could sabotage their efforts. This alliance 
with government representatives was exploited by 
community leaders as a source of status and access to 
government resources. Community leaders in 
Kanyati went to the extent of notifying the repre­
sentatives of the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU) 
that community leaders could not be expected to co­
operate with ZFU programmes since the ZFU repre­
sentatives did not bother to inform the leaders when 
they came into the area to visit their area 
committees27.
27 Proceedings of the Workshop on Wildlife and 
Institutional Developments in Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
Communal Lands, Kariba, 1/4/92.
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Peluso goes further to point out that such an 
extension strategy led to a project being personified 
in the officers responsible, who were then expected 
to dispense their services as patrons. There was some 
latitude for the extension workers and project staff in 
Kanyati to use their discretion in dispensing the 
services that they provided. An incident involving 
the approval by project staff of a request by a resi­
dent of one Video to cut trees for poles to build a 
tobacco bam in another Video when the responsible 
community leaders had turned down the request is a 
case in point. The community leaders could do no 
more than inform the project staff that future 
requests would be vigorously resisted.
Project investment and distribution o f benefits
More illustrative of the form and content of the 
power which the project and its staff wielded over 
the community were the issues surrounding project 
investment and the distribution of the benefits. 
Project management continued controlling and 
making critical decisions for the Tillage Association, 
which hired out tractors for tillage and secured 
inputs and markets for the membership, without 
consulting the elected local management committee 
and the general membership. This was done on the 
pretext that the community could not be trusted with 
running the association because its members did not 
have the requisite skills. This despite earlier 
commitments to devolving control and ownership of 
the Tillage Association to the membership. The 
membership of the association reacted against such 
control in a general meeting whereupon a 
commitment was made to involve them in decision 
making. For the community to have been able to 
manage the association effectively required a 
sustained training programme which had not yet 
been put in place. Complaints were also made that 
tractors spent disproportionate amounts of time with 
tobacco farmers compared to the time they spent 
with the rest of the farmers28.
There was almost a complete absence of the 
project's presence in one VIDCO, Kanyati, because 
of the prevalence of land disputes and subsequent 
neglect by extension and project staff. No boreholes 
had been sunk and no secondary roads had been cut.
28 Interview with group of farmers 28/1/91.
Other spheres of the project's operations were 
similarly conducted without consideration of 
community sentiments. There was widespread 
discontent with road cutting operations which ate 
into people's fields. No compensation was made to 
those farmers whose fields were affected. Instead, 
community leaders were asked to deal with the 
complaints individually. The community leaders had 
nothing to offer and ended up prevailing on the road 
cutting crews not to point road drainage lines 
towards people's fields because of the potential 
serious erosion consequences.
Traditional power
One locus of power which could have been useful in 
the management of natural resources was traditional 
authority as has been shown by Schoffeleers (1978). 
However, secular ‘traditional’ power was eroded by 
the state, first through the severing of links between 
Hurungwe chiefs and the formative Kanyati 
sabhukus; and second, through the creation of 
VIDCOs which were the only local representative 
organs recognised by the state. Other secular ‘tradi­
tional’ authorities ie. lineage heads got their 
influence, not through recourse to tradition, but 
through sitting on the development committees. 
‘Traditional’ religious power, shown through a 
mhondoro spirit medium, was disregarded by both 
the state and the majority of the local population. 
Because of the antipathy shown to the mhondoro 
spirit medium and traditional religion in general by 
some sections of the community, there was no clear 
link for traditional religion to legitimise traditional 
secular authority. The way the mhondoro spirit 
medium attempted to manipulate himself into a 
position of prominence and the reaction of the state 
provides a window into unravelling these dynamics.
Manouvres o f the mhondoro
The mhondoro (lion spirit) medium who resided in 
Kanyati was one of the first settlers, having relocated 
from the neighbouring Hurungwe communal area. 
Mhondoros have traditionally provided spirit 
guidance to much larger areas than do ordinary spirit 
mediums who provide guidance to lineages. 
Mhondoros also act as advisers to chiefs. The 
mhondoro spirit medium's intention on initial 
settlement was to create a sub-chiefship under a
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Hurungwe chief from whence he came to which sub- 
chiefship he would be strongly aligned. A large 
number of immigrants into Kanyati indeed were 
given permission to settle through the Hurungwe 
chief (Chief Nematombo). There had been 
competition from another Hurungwe chief (Chief 
Nyamhunga) in sending immigrants to Kanyati. As 
government involvement increased, led by Kariba 
District Administration, the mhondoro spirit 
medium's strategy then shifted to claiming that in 
fact there was a dormant chiefship (Nemarindi) 
whose descendants were living under Chief 
Nematombo (Hurungwe) who had been living close 
to Kanyati at the time Lake Kariba was built. The 
descendants had dispersed as the lake flooded. 
However, none of the descendants were resident in 
Kanyati except for the extended family of the 
mhondoro spirit medium.
Kariba District Administration decided to 
establish VIDCOs as the only local authorities in 
Kanyati and not bother with trying to reconstruct 
what perhaps might have been perceived as tenuous 
territorial claims by the mhondoro spirit medium. 
During this time, as has been noted by Alexander 
(n.d.), chiefs had lost a lot of their power as a 
consequence of their perceived alliance with the 
settler state and what was perceived to be their 
‘perniciously traditionalist and conservative 
influence’ in an atmosphere pregnant with socialist 
rhetoric.
The majority of immigrants who came from other 
parts of the country other than Hurungwe were 
happy with the decision to be under Kariba District, 
notwithstanding that there were groups of people 
who went along with the mhondoro spirit medium's 
plans, particularly those who had acquired authority 
as temporary sabhukus. On the one hand, they had 
immediately rid themselves of overlordship by the 
Hurungwe chiefs who had been usurping payment 
from the immigrants to allow them to settle in 
Kanyati, and on the other, an opportunity had pre­
sented itself for them to control their own affairs 
through democratic structures. Community feelings 
against the mhondoro spirit medium were 
particularly high during the course of fieldwork as 
he was accused of inviting more Hurungwe residents 
to settle in Kanyati so as to increase his following, 
something which was perceived as going against 
land use provisions. The mhondoro spirit medium 
was against the top-down approach to land use 
planning and the creation of VIDCOs. He articulated
his interests to District Administration as he did at 
one point by asking rhetorically, ‘Where else in 
Zimbabwe are chiefs and lion spirits/spirit mediums 
unrecognised?’
In the short run, it did not appear that the 
mhondoro spirit medium would be able to impose 
himself over an area larger than the VIDCO 
(Chebere) where he resided, in which his immediate 
relatives and other former Hurungwe residents were 
concentrated. The extension of his authority relied 
on the support he could muster from Hurungwe 
chiefs who were cut off administratively from 
Kanyati, and the District Administration which was 
unlikely to change its stance having already set a 
precedent29. In addition most of the Kanyati 
residents could insulate themselves from his 
influence by appealing to a different cosmology. 
Most belonged to mainstream Christian and African 
Independent Churches and proclaimed an 
unwillingness to dabble in ‘traditional’ ritualistic 
behaviour. It seemed that these claims of difference 
were likely to be attenuated if serious contestations 
came about.
As things stood, there was an absence of a 
‘traditional’ authority which could define and 
enforce sacred controls on the use of the woodlands. 
Both the state and the local population had an 
ambiguous relationship with the mhondoro spirit 
medium and the institutions he represented. The 
potential role of the mhondoro spirit medium was 
important to the extent that he might have provided 
a check on state plans in the area and established 
control over land settlement and use. His influence 
was limited to a small group of his relatives. Beyond 
this group there was some support from former 
sabhukus of Hurungwe origin who were replaced by
29 On a visit made to Kanyati in 1993 I met a large party 
from Hurungwe who had come for a bira (propitiation) 
gathering and to build a ‘home’ for the mhondoro spirit 
medium (termed Dendemaro). The people in the party said 
that they had been urged to attend by Chief Nematombo. Other 
people in the party claimed that the bira was being held so that 
a person who was claiming possession by a late Chief 
Nemarindi could ‘come out’ publicly. The person claiming 
possession would nominate a person for the Nemarindi 
chiefship, it was claimed. Other Kanyati residents I spoke to 
were sceptical of these proceedings pointing out that the 
mhondoro's intentions were likely to clash with those of Omay 
Communal Land chiefs who had similar intentions for 
Kanyati.
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the Videos.
In some cases, lineages with spirit mediums 
consulted the mhondoro spirit medium on whether or 
not their lineage spirit medium could be recognized. 
Some settlers observed a rest day (chisi) declared by 
the mhondoro spirit medium. The arrangement 
introduced a complication in that the settlers then 
needed to observe two rest days in a week, one day 
following their own traditions and the other as 
dictated by the mhondoro spirit medium (referred to 
as chisi chasahwira-a special ritually validated rest 
day for a ‘friend’). Some of these settlers did not 
bother observing the mhondoro spirit medium's rest 
day as it would involve losing time from their work 
schedules. Chisi denotes ritual control over land. The 
fact that no group managed to establish its own day 
as the chisi for all Kanyati residents pointed to 
struggles at the level of ritual which had still to be 
resolved30 *.
The position o f lineage heads
The heads of lineages were ‘first comers’ who 
‘showed the place’ to newcomers and mediated 
between the settlers and the Hurungwe chiefs. The 
status of the lineage heads was raised as new layers 
of immigrants voluntarily ‘inserted’ themselves 
under them (cf KopytofF, 1987). The ‘first comer’ 
was also the elected VIDCO chair in one of the three 
VIDCOs which were studied. Thus, some lineage 
heads were able to influence the political process. 
Some of these lineage heads had links with the 
mhondoro spirit medium, in cases where their place 
of origin was Hurungwe. Most lineage heads did not 
want to be associated with him for reasons given 
previously.
Spiritual traditional power was also used in land 
disputes. A case in point was when a settler was 
unable to take over fields allocated to her because the 
fields were being used by a spirit medium and 
traditional healer and she feared that a spell would 
be put on her. The spirit medium continued to use
301 received information that the mhondoro spirit medium
had passed away in 1994. Doubtless, another medium will
come up, but it may take a long time before that happens. The
next medium might not have as much leverage as the previous
one given changes over time in the political landscape in
Kanyati. j
the fields. The owner was not bothered to involve the 
local leadership on the issue.
The traditional authorities were biding their time 
and had chosen to engage in activities that had ritual 
significance and which were important as recruiting 
grounds for followers, it would appear. These 
activities included healing the sick, consultations 
with other spirit mediums and struggles over chisi 
1 days. These activities served to remind the 
community of the traditional authorities' potential 
power. Still, there were no viable structures within 
which traditional authorities could prevail on re­
source management matters.
Inter-household power
As distinct from traditional power discussed above, 
inter-household power refers to the collective power 
exhibited by local people. In this section I point out 
and explain those factors making for convergence 
and/or divergence of interest among households. 
These factors were the tendency to split or band 
together along economic interests, and lineage and 
ethnic lines further eroding the possibilities for 
collective action.
Economic differentiation
Household differentiation can lead to uncertainty and 
lack of concern with the aims of communal 
management of natural resources (Lawry, 1990). The 
sale of crops and off-farm income were the most 
important vehicles of household economic 
differentiation in Kanyati. _
The ARDA and TTCB report points out that the 
largest source of total household income was from 
the sale of crops. Income from crops made up 69,5% 
of total income earned on average. The smaller 
sample survey that I conducted indicated that the 
mean agricultural income is Z$508.31 per annum 
and the range is Z$1901 per annum, thus showing a 
high degree of variation in local terms. About 24% 
of the households in the sample had no income from 
crops.
Crops were followed by off-farm income in terms 
of overall household security in the ARDA and 
TTCB survey. Off-farm income made up 24,8% of 
the income on average. 13% of the off-farm income 
was earned within Kanyati. Employment 
opportunities were available through the project in
building, construction of dams and tsetse control 
operations. The bulk of those employed were 
temporary employees. Income earned outside 
Kanyati constituted 11% of total income and was at 
Z$128.00 per month on average.
The average income earned within Kanyati 
inclusive of all income sources was Z$ 1089.00 per 
annum. The average income increased with livestock 
ownership. The numbers of cattle owned by residents 
were increasing all the time. The ARDA and TTCB 
survey found that 31% of farmers kept cattle and on 
average each farmer owned 4.8 head. 17% of 
farmers kept cattle outside of the project area, on 
average keeping a total of 6 head outside the land 
use project area. Farmers expressed a wish to bring 
them into Kanyati as soon as the ban on cattle 
keeping was lifted in Ward B (p.34).
The gaps in incomes among households should 
increase with the introduction of tobacco, a high 
income earner but also a high input crop. It could be 
expected that not all the fanners would be able to 
grow the crop even with the initial project subsidies.
As previously noted the gaps in incomes occurred 
at least in part under the sponsorship of the state. A 
considerable number of farmers were not happy with 
the unevenness and perceived impoverishment of 
some farmers from state intervention. To quote one 
farmer:
‘No, I am not a member of the ZFU 
or the Tillage Association. I still 
want to see how they function. I do 
not have cattle. I am still suspicious 
of ARDA intentions. I was not happy 
with being moved from the fields I 
had initially chosen. They were more 
fertile than the ones I was allocated 
under the project’37 31*.
As at October 1991 membership of the Tillage 
Association stood at 566 out of a total of about 847 
plotholders (67%) (Nhira, 1992b). There were other 
economic interest organizations such as area 
committees of the ZFU and Catholic Development 
Commission (CADEC) input supply co-operatives. 
The project tillage association dispensed its services 
to a limited number of farmers although, as initially 
envisioned, it should have been all inclusive in its 
activities and membership. Farmers who were not 
benefiting were therefore at the least ambivalent
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37 Interview with Mr.Maramba, Makande Video, 16/8/90.
about the project's presence or hostile to it outright. 
It was not surprising that some farmers were also 
ambivalent about the woodlots set up under the 
project, particularly since arrangements for benefit 
distribution had not been discussed in the wider 
community. Inequalities also tended to express 
themselves across VIDCOs due to differences in 
natural resource endowments.
It was not possible to separate out the individual 
effect of crop sales, off-farm income and livestock 
ownership on production and the differences in 
average incomes earned per household in different 
VIDCOs. The differences in average household 
income across VIDCOs are noticeable in the 
following table on one variable contained in the 
original ARDA and TTCB report.
These differences should be considered high in a 
local context and could have been magnified were 
consideration taken of individual households. Social 
differentiation was occurring under the uneven 
sponsorship of the state. Accumulation of wealth was 
being achieved, in part, through methods that 
ignored community opinions about the exploitation 
of communally held resources for private gain for 
which their was little community sanction.
Ethnicity and lineage organization
Ethnicity was perceived as important in local 
political discourse33. It also exhibited potential for 
developing common identity for people living in 
close proximity. Common identity could then be 
used as a mobilising force for activities around 
communal management of natural resources. 
However, as is shown below, ethnicity and common 
identity were tenuous factors with respect to control 
of the usage of woodlands.
Kanyati settlers came from all parts of Zimbabwe 
with the majority coming from Masvingo Province 
(42.8%) and the Midlands (20.9%) (ARDA and 
TTCB, 1990:10). While ethnicity cannot be strictly 
related to geographical area of origin, it was not 
surprising that the majority of household heads 
(59.25%) considered themselves as Karanga33. The
31 Ethnicity is used here as self defined by the actors
involved.
33 Karanga is an ethnic group that is generally identified 
with South Central Zimbabwe which includes Masvingo and 
Midlands provinces. South Central Zimbabwe is drought 
prone and highly populated relative to the rest of the country.
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Karanga ethnic group provided the political 
leadership such as councillors and VHDCO chairs 
because Karanga voters who were in the majority 
tended to vote for other Karangas. The example 
quoted in the section above of a VHDCO in which 
Korekores were struggling to capture political office 
without success illustrates Karanga dominance.
The sample survey that I conducted in three 
VHDCOs suggests district of origin, ethnicity and 
residential location (VHDCO) were closely 
associated. People who were related (either classifi- 
catory kin or consanguinial kin) tended to reside in 
the same VHDCO in general. There was some limited 
choice as to where one could settle as was noted 
earlier.
Households which were previously unrelated 
were increasingly becoming related through 
intermarriages and manipulation of social identity 
since they found themselves living in close 
proximity. Cases of land disputes discussed above 
suggested that in cases where neighbours still 
regarded each other as strangers, there was a 
potential for acrimonious and seemingly endless 
disputes to occur without the VHDCOs being able to 
mediate effectively.
Social identity could make for common interests 
as was shown when all the VIDCOs presented a 
common position on the need for VIDCOs to control 
land allocation so that they could distribute it to local 
residents fairly. There was also a consensus that 
VIDCOs should control access to trees and 
woodlands within their boundaries. However, social 
identity seemed a tenuous factor in determining 
effective control over the usage of the woodlands 
within the VIDCO as discussed in Section One of 
this article.
Intra household power
Intra household power for the purposes of the 
research on which this article is based denoted 
differences between men and women with respect to 
their views on woodland management. It also 
denoted the primacy accorded to each of the views in 
local discourse.
It was found that there was a difference between 
the general views expressed by women and those of 
men even for those sharing the same household. The 
views of women tended to coincide as did those of
men. Women appealed for government intervention 
and the hardening of rule application with respect to 
woodland usage arguing that controls were not being 
effective. The reason was because women bore the 
brunt of collecting fuelwood for household use and 
feared that as agricultural land was cleared they 
might have to travel greater distances to obtain 
fuelwood. Male community members used a type of 
discourse that was a reaction against further govern­
ment interference. The discourse pointed to the need 
for more community empowerment while 
underplaying the need for more controls on 
woodland usage. Examples of the discourse that was 
used by men are:
‘The situation has not worsened’;
‘VIDCOs need to control the use of the 
woodlands’;
‘Let the woodlot trees mature first before 
bringing in further controls’; and
‘We do not need controls on the use of the 
woodlands but on further clearance of land for 
agriculture’.
Loaded as they are, such statements reflect the 
preoccupation of men with changing the balance of 
power between the Kanyati community and the state. 
Conservation was not much of a priority for them. 
Men's views were considered more important since 
they dominated community institutions as office 
bearers. There was little participation by women in 
community institutions.
Conclusion
Section One of this article dealt with the range of 
controls that were shown in the study context with 
regard to the use of household controlled trees and 
communal woodlands. Mechanisms for controlling 
the use of household resources included the use of 
physical and ‘social’ fences which were effective. 
Extension advice in relation to the use of woodlands 
was advisory but did not support local institutions in 
managing the resources. The forms of control 
exhibited in controlling woodland use included 
cultural forms and those applied by new state- 
initiated local institutions. Cultural controls were 
rather diffuse and were not backed up by traditional 
authority. Controls by the new local institutions were 
widely understood but largely not applied to local 
people. Local institutions were not backed up by
project support in their attempts to manage the 
woodlands. Project support focussed on developing 
woodlots and agroforestry. There was no 
appreciation of the fact that woodlots and 
agroforestry were unlikely to have an impact as 
marked as minor changes in the management of 
existing woodlands.
The article sought to explain the ineffectiveness 
in managing communal woodlands by looking at the 
loci of power within the local arena of action in 
Section Two. These loci of power were seen as the 
state, traditional authority, the community in 
general, and men and women.
The state was all pervasive in its influence and 
left little room for community initiatives. Agencies 
associated with the state were pre-occupied with 
controlling land settlement and land use while 
showing little concern for woodland management or 
the implications of land use for the status of 
woodlands. State agency extension support activities 
were differentiated and led to community
segmentation which tended to erode community 
cohesiveness. Extension activities also favoured 
crops that relied on exploitation of woodlands on 
their preparation after harvest, such as tobacco. The 
exploitation of woodlands was done without 
community sanction.
Traditional authority had been eroded by the state 
and so could not contribute to woodland 
management initiatives. The community exhibited 
differential interests partly as a result of differential 
impacts of the project as pointed out above and 
partly as a result of its make-up. Apart from ethnic 
and lineage divisions, the community was further 
divided according to different perceptions about 
appropriate community sanctions to be applied to 
woodland use. Women were in favour of hardening 
the rules of use for fear of continued heavy depletion 
of the resources while men were pre-occupied with 
community empowerment viz a viz project 
management and state agencies. Men tended to 
underplay the need for more controls in woodland 
use. The views of men were dominant because of 
their greater access to community institutions.
Given these conclusions the question about the 
most appropriate ways of ensuring that woodlands 
are accorded attention needs to be posed. First, a 
shift in the locus of power in favour of the 
communities and away from the state would have to
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be made in practiced Second, such a shift would 
have to be accompanied by greater support to local 
institutions particularly in terms of institution 
building initiatives. As observed above there is much 
that resides in communities which can segment their 
interests thus placing bottlenecks on collective 
action. Thus, extension needs to rise above such 
differences. Third and last, state extension activities 
should include woodlands as an integral form of land 
use.
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